Further north, Russian forces have taken control of Pivnichne and Zalizne, among other towns, in their advance towards the city of Toretsk.

There have also been losses in Luhansk and Kharkiv. Russian troops have taken 350 sq km of territory in Luhansk this year. At the end of November, they controlled 98.6% of the region.

Similarly in Kharkiv, Ukraine has lost 392 sq km of territory since January this year. In Kupiansk, one of the largest cities in eastern Kharkiv, there has been fighting this month for the first time since it was reclaimed by Ukraine in its 2022 counteroffensive.

Ukraine made some small gains earlier this year, after repelling major offensives in northern Kharkiv and Luhansk, but overall, the trend in territory losses has continued.

The analysis shows that Russia has incrementally made gains across the year, especially in Donetsk, and controls a majority of the land in each of the four regions it illegally annexed in 2022 — Luhansk, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk.

Of the four, Donetsk remains the region where Russian forces control the smallest proportion of land but has been the most significant gains in recent weeks.

Since November last year, 29 villages and towns with pre-war populations over 1,000 people have been claimed by Russia, of which 25 were in Donetsk.

Aside from these settlements, the majority of the land claimed by Russia in the last year has been rural – whether agricultural land, forests or fields.

George Barros, Russia team lead at the ISW, said Ukraine was on track to lose more ground but that attention had to be paid to what kind of land Russia was taking.

He said: “Though Vuhledar and Avdiivka were significant objectives, Russia has not fundamentally unhinged Ukraine’s defensive positions. Their territory gains are mostly agricultural land, and their losses – 30-50,000 troops [either dead or injured] a month – are completely unsustainable. The Russians won’t have waves of infantry and vehicles to send like they used to assuming the current rate of attrition holds over the next year. They are performing very poorly.”

Dr Marina Miron, a researcher at King’s College London’s war studies department, said Russia’s aim was to stretch Ukraine’s forces as much as possible with offensives across eastern Ukraine. “There is a possibility that the front might collapse, especially in the regions south of Vuhledar.”

Miron assessed that the war, in its current form, would probably end in 2025 – but Ukraine would enter any ceasefire negotiations on the backfoot.

She said: “Ukraine relies heavily on western support, which is decreasing. Donald Trump’s election only adds more uncertainty. Morale is very low in Ukraine’s army, after ‘meat grinder’ battles like Bakhmut, and they’re not recruiting the troops that they need. Russia simply has more potential, more resources and more troops.”

As well as areas fully under Russian control, the map above also shows Russian advances, indicating areas where Russian forces are present but not in control.

The land area estimates used in this analysis are based on analysis of daily control files from the ISW. These files assess the extent of territory controlled or contested by Russian forces on a daily basis. These may be documented a few days after particular events happen owing to the way ISW assesses and verifies changes in territory control.